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I

n December 2013, the White House announced
its second-ever Open Government National
Action Plan. The ﬁve highlighted areas for
action included improvements to the Freedom of
Information Act, petitioning platforms, and greater
data availability. The remaining two highlighted areas
dealt with ﬁnancial accountability, more speciﬁcally, membership in the Global Initiative for Fiscal
Transparency (GIFT; see http://ﬁscaltransparency.
net), and participatory budgeting, which the Barack
Obama administration deﬁned as “giving citizens
a voice in how taxpayer dollars are spent in their
communities.”1

In many ways, this plan for “open government”
responds to mounting criticism regarding President
Obama’s surveillance policies and attempts to counter
the dysfunction associated with ﬁscal impasses and
budget shutdowns. Such a dose of transparency
could bolster the American government’s credibility.
Strikingly, the plan follows models set by middleincome countries rather than establishing the United
States as the vanguard in innovative administrative
policies. GIFT is partly led by the Brazilian Ministry
of Planning and the Department of Budget and
Management of the Philippines; participatory budgeting started more than two decades ago in Brazil. That
the White House has announced these programs
nationally, then, reﬂects just how mainstream and
essential to legitimacy such open government policies
have become.
Given the simultaneous (and certainly not coincidental) proliferation of ﬁnancial crises and ﬁscal transparency projects around the world, there have been
surprisingly few policy-oriented, comparative studies
of public budgets. Open Budgets: The Political Economy
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of Transparency, Participation, and Accountability,
edited by Sanjeev Khagram, Archon Fung, and Paolo
de Renzio, goes a long way toward ﬁlling this gap and
remedying the situation.
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The book aims to answer three key questions: the ﬁrst
concerns the emergence and sustainability of ﬁscal
transparency and participation, the second explores
which conditions and mechanisms lead to greater
government responsiveness (including outcomes such
as reduced corruption and better budget allocations),
and the third asks whether greater transparency leads
to greater participation. The book provides a framework for analysis; a cogent summary of the relevant
(and admittedly limited) theoretical and empirical
literature on ﬁscal transparency, participation, and
accountability; and highlights eight country-level
case studies. These studies draw on data from the
Open Budget Index (OBI), a biannual eﬀort by the
International Budget Partnership to assess budget
transparency across nations. The OBI assesses countries’ availability and comprehensiveness of eight key
documents, including a pre-budget statement that
presents key assumptions (such as overall economic
forecasts, especially important in countries that rely
on volatile commodities such as crude oil), an audit
report, and a citizens’ budget that minimizes technical
language.
The introductory chapter does a commendable job of
summarizing the relevant literatures. For example, the
editors emphasize the extent to which transparency
laws are not properly implemented and the extent
to which transparency does not beget participation
or accountability. The latter depend much more on
oppositional political parties, civil society organizations, and popular media. It makes sense, then,
that critical gaps in international standards concern
legislative oversight of executive budgets and popular
participation by civil society organizations and everyday citizens. How can governments ensure that the
public successfully accesses and uses data thoughtfully
and strategically?
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Partly because of the subject matter’s complexity
and the diversity of the case studies, the introduction provides an analytical framework rather than a
set of conclusive ﬁndings. For instance, most of the
associations—such as decentralization—depend on
other contextual factors. The direction of causality
also remains elusive. Countries with higher per capita
incomes tend to be more transparent, but is that
because they have built the capacity to administer
taxes and budget allocations eﬃciently, with welltrained staﬀ and a professionalized bureaucracy, or the
other way around? Many countries with large endowments of natural resources suﬀer from a “resource
curse,” corrupt governments, and steep inequalities.
What accounts for the exceptions to the rule? The indepth country case studies begin to provide answers
by examining the combinations and sequencing of
factors. They are presented in descending order, from
those with the highest OBI score to those with the
lowest: South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico,
Guatemala, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Senegal.
While each of these chapters does a solid job of simultaneously arguing a defensible thesis and presenting
an overview of the country’s relevant recent history
and political economy, the cases at the beginning
and end of the spectrum are the most startling and
interesting. This is partly because they deal less with
administrative capacity and pervasive, almost depressingly predictable cases of corruption and more with
how speciﬁc governments belied expectations and
either made use of political crises or failed to meaningfully implement well-intentioned laws. Thus, this
review gives more room to the chapters on South
Africa, Brazil, South Korea, and Senegal.
As Steven Friedman states, South Africa’s success
is counterintuitive because its budget transparency
came not from “public pressure but from its insulation” (51). The African National Congress (ANC)
has controlled the government since the country’s
democratization in 1994. The ANC has thus been
able to enact transparency laws in its reformist zeal,
but, “[i]ronically, one consequence of majority rule
was a government elected in the main by poor black
people that was obsessed with demonstrating its competence to the advantaged minority,” the white elites
who remain economically advantaged (59).
Between public protests in low-income black townships and payment boycotts among white suburbanites, all decrying government waste and corruption,
“there is . . . no lack of interest in budgetary issues”
in South Africa (67). The treasury has been able to
assert the importance of transparency in at least partly
resisting patronage politics. Businesses have been able
to make use of public data to assess ﬁnancial risk,
and major trade unions have used data to propose
alternative budgets that better serve high-need
2
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groups. Because the South African constitution lists
social and economic rights alongside civil ones, civil
society organizations have generated analyses proving, in court, that greater health funds (particularly
for antiretroviral treatment) and school funds must be
distributed to render rights to health and education
meaningful.
Nevertheless, Friedman argues that the country’s
reforms emphasized transparency in form rather than
in substance and, in some ways, ensured that the citizenry was not empowered in the process. Oppositional
political parties, often the political actors who point
out malfeasance in the government, were not strong
enough to do so. Civil society organizations, especially those that represented the least powerful—the
unemployed or those working in informal sectors and
outside of labor unions—did not possess the expertise to challenge the ANC. The other key potential
actor, the popular media, has not managed to foster
constructive debate because copious technical data are
not translated for lay readers, and the government’s
dissemination strategies remain limited. Thus, these
transparency laws are still largely administrative tools
rather than levers for democracy.
In Brazil’s case, presented by Jorge Antonio Alves
and Patrick Heller, ﬁscal transparency is especially
important because Brazil’s public sector is unusually
large and because it has assumed increasing signiﬁcance with social welfare initiatives since democratization. The government regularly releases a vast array
of disaggregated data shortly after disbursement. This
means that civil society organizations and everyday
citizens can actually engage with the data and easily
report errors, and there exists participation as well as
transparency.
Despite these signiﬁcant successes, Brazil’s outcomes
are mixed beneath the surface. Because many budget
allocations are automatic, there is little room for ﬂexibility and negotiation. This means that discretionary
funds are prone to pork barrel politics, and executive politicians use disbursement authorization as a
bargaining chip in times of ﬁscal austerity. Politicians
work within the system to meet and “ﬁx” outcomes—
for instance, by artiﬁcially lowering projected growth
during the year to make sure they meet their budgets
and then regularly giving out “Christmas bonuses” at
year’s end. While the transparency initiatives have not
dramatically lowered corruption, they have made it
more obvious.
The chapter provides a good overview of how democratization and macroeconomic stabilization together
helped bring about the three milestone foundations
in Brazilian budget transparency: the 1988 Citizen
Constitution, the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law, and
the 2009 Transparency Law. The 2000 law forced state

governments to document their ballooning debts and
to abide by budget guidelines (so that, for instance,
they did not spend more during election years and
leave the mess for their successors). But civil society
organizations felt that their input was not seriously
considered; for example, they were not given passwords to access government data. A series of political
scandals in 2009 presented a window of opportunity
for new mandates. The 2009 law allows the federal
government to freeze transfers if budgets are not
revealed in “real time.” Executives must now also
disclose daily revenues and line items, including who
got paid how much and what services were rendered,
in “transparency portals.”
Another notable aspect of the Brazilian experience is
that of coordinated decentralization, well documented
in studies on both participatory budgeting and health
councils. In particular, local executives are incentivized to properly disseminate budget data because the
health councils can deny them federal resources if they
do not do so.
The South Korean case, authored by Jong-sung You
and Wonhee Lee, feels similar to the Brazilian one in
that many transparency laws were ﬁrst passed during
democratization, and newer mandates strengthened
implementation considerably following more recent
scandals. In this case, the “IMF-plus” reforms after
the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and “Three Plus One”
reforms (performance goals and indicators, an information technology system, and sectoral budget ceilings, coordinated through a ﬁve-year plan) from 2003
to 2007 greatly improved the eﬃciency of the budget
process. They also provided protection for whistleblowers and incentive programs to report public
waste, reduced the reach of powerful chaebol private
sector conglomerates, and established new agencies for
eﬀective checks and balances.
As with the other countries in this book, there are limitations to South Korea’s transparency. Extrabudgetary
special funds, “sacred territories,” “national security
costs,” and transfers between the federal and local
governments are either oﬀ limits or diﬃcult to track.
More remarkable are the country’s successes. Not just
budgets, but also many budget meetings, are open
to the public. There is strong oversight by an independent audit institution with more than 900 staﬀ,
including certiﬁed accountants and lawyers, with real
powers regarding disciplinary actions. As of 2010,
more than one-third of municipalities had implemented participatory budgeting. It really appears as if
institutional cultures have changed: potentially dubious “public interest corporation contracts” declined
from 58 percent in 1985 to 7.7 percent in 1997 in the
central government, and the percentage of reported
bribes of public oﬃcials decreased from 25 percent in
2000 to 5 percent in 2008. The country’s reputation

as preeminent regarding public access and use of technology is also reﬂected here; of the case studies in the
book, South Korea seems to be the only one that can
claim that its digital information system (D-Brain),
developed in 2004, allows the public access with ease.
Participation by South Korean budget experts and
civil society organizations appears to have been essential. Groups such as Citizens Against Budget Waste
provided classes on budget literacy to average citizens,
and they were generally well organized and nonpartisan. The consequent data made a diﬀerence in debates
on the national debt, debt ceiling, and tax cuts. When
welfare policies expanded, the ultimate trifecta of a
top-down system with a competent bureaucracy, a
National Fiscal Management Plan that people trusted,
and active vetting and participation by civil society
groups and everyday citizens allowed for rapid disbursement of public funds.
A set of common themes emerge from the “middle
of the spectrum” (the Mexico, Guatemala, Tanzania,
and Vietnam case studies). Citizens are either turned
oﬀ or intimidated enough to not participate, all but
eliminating meaningful government accountability
to the public. Even where budget transparency laws
exist, the oﬀ-limits parts of the budgets become
veritable “black holes,” so that exceptions to open
budgets become the rule. There are not enough details
or sensitivity analyses in national budgets to compare
them to previous years, to be sure of their accuracy or
means of composition, or to gauge their performance.
No real consequences follow poor performance, and
social actors are not partners in oversight. Popular
media is too concentrated to provoke debate. In
Mexico, for instance, there are just two major television companies.
The chapter on Guatemala is especially helpful in
highlighting the long-term institutional traumas
of war, describing a context in which even political
parties remain ephemeral and showing how ideological polarization can be helpful, at least, in prompting
political actors to articulate clear positions in budget
debates. A helpful chart (167) summarizes how legislators can short-circuit laws by restoring loopholes
right after they pass. The Tanzanian and Vietnamese
cases are fascinating because reforms, as limited as
they are, came without accompanying democratization. In some ways, combating corruption and
economic growth are higher priorities than democratization and transparency in those contexts, especially
when even oversight institutions do not necessarily
receive accurate data.
These chapters also show that progress can be made
incrementally and that imperfect transparency
reforms remain better than none at all. In Mexico,
requests for information skyrocketed after an access
Book Review 3

law went into eﬀect in 2003. In Tanzania, the ruling
political party remains hegemonic, but internal rifts
have prompted politicians within the party to keep
each other accountable. Even without penalty powers and full autonomy, Vietnam’s audit agency and
national assembly bring attention to budget priorities
and deliberation, inviting public scrutiny.
The last chapter, by Linda Beck, E. H. Seydou
Nourou Toure, and Aliou Faye, on Senegal’s eﬀorts
at transparency reform, renders explicit many of the
comparisons readers may implicitly make between
chapters (say, between the Mexican and Guatemalan
cases, with similar OBI scores but diﬀerent historical
contexts and party politics scenarios). For instance,
the authors state that, on average, Anglophone
African countries tend to do better than Francophone
ones, and Senegal is just one of ﬁve former French
colonies with a score of 5 or lower on the 2010 OBI.
Yet, they argue, this is less a reﬂection of colonial
legacy than the current context. The legislature and
audit institutions are weak, lacking the capacity to
hold the executive branch accountable. Although
some budget transparency measures were enacted as
part of their structural adjustment programs with
international donors, these measures were made
absent suﬃcient consultation with the general public.
Further, in a context of hyperpresidentialism and
one dominant political party, international donor
pressure to enhance legislative participation in the
budget process does not give due consideration to the
political constraints that will continue to limit their
autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Low literacy
rates (even among members of parliament) also mean
that detailed documents are meaningless to most
Senegalese without an accompanying citizens’ budget.
Donors, in some ways, are more focused on their own
access to reliable numbers than on expanding the public’s access. To address such issues, donors can build
capacity among civil society organizations to provide
independent analyses and monitoring and encourage
public participation alongside transparency.
The case studies are especially strong in showing
how policy entrepreneurs (presidents, political parties, international donors, and others—including
determined ordinary citizens) can use a large-scale,
especially atrocious corruption scandal as a window
of opportunity to push through ﬁscal transparency
reforms. Although the private sector often opposes
the expansion of government regulations or powers,
ﬁscal transparency beneﬁts the private sector because
it facilitates higher-grade investments.
Such transparency laws, however, mean little without
a forceful and robust civil society. Budgetary information must be disaggregated and relatively timely to be
meaningful and to allow academics and civil society
organizations to point out inequitable or suspicious
4
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patterns and propose alternative budgets. The popular
media has to be free and well informed enough to
disseminate these debates widely. And data cannot be
restricted to the national level, as capacity issues and
political appointments tend to proliferate at the local
levels, particularly in poorer regions. Further analyses
would be helpful, especially on how central governments help diﬀuse best practices among localities and
manage local governments that refuse to cooperate
either because they are controlled by oppositional parties or corrupt oﬃcials.
I wish that the editors had provided a concluding
chapter (one that builds on the details elucidated in
the in-depth case studies) and imposed a bit more of
a comparative framework on the case study chapters.
While I appreciated the wide range of factors examined in the eight case study chapters, ideally, a series of
tables would summarize which factors were comparable and which factors were not. Given the topics at
hand—public access to information and what it takes
to make the information legible to everyday citizens,
not just technocrats, bureaucrats, and experts—I also
longed for more invitations to engage with the data
so as to better understand patterns through interactive platforms. To what extent did the broad correlates
mentioned in the introductory chapter apply in each
case? What were the main permutations of each correlate? What helped to explain the exceptions?
Moreover, viewing the answers for the eight case studies together would help readers glean a slightly more
nuanced, balanced understanding than that provided
in the introduction alone, while helping readers keep
the big picture in mind. Just as the last chapter was
especially elucidating because it contrasts Senegal with
Mali and Burkina Faso in its analysis, it would have
been helpful to contrast each country, however brieﬂy,
with one or two similar countries to better illustrate
what programs and policies seem reasonable for their
governments to undertake. The Mexico chapter mentions the potential use of a central agency like that
in Ecuador or Taiwan, for example, but it does not
describe what that would look like. I also wish that
the editors had included one Global North country,
such as the United States (with a recent OBI score in
the upper 70s) to serve as a point of reference and to
help readers contextualize these readings (and encourage course adoption).
Last but not least, a critical examination of the OBI
itself would be helpful. The entire book builds on the
OBI data set, which facilitates comparative analysis.
But what are the broader assumptions embedded in
the OBI formulation and criteria? A theme from the
participatory budgeting literature, for instance, is
that as that process becomes widespread, many of the
original goals of social justice, equity, and redistribution have become subservient to declared missions of

governmental transparency. Is there something similar
happening with open budgets overall?
Still, these are small quibbles regarding an otherwise
strong work, and a timely one at that. The book complements the quickly growing literature on participatory budgeting and on implementation at the local
level. With new participating governments, such as
the American presidential administration, every year,
the literature will continue to grow. The book would
best serve students in master’s-level public administration, public policy, planning, or politics programs.
However, it would also serve well in political science,
civic engagement, and area studies classes, and it is
accessible to more advanced undergraduate students.

The chapters are clearly written, and the conceptual
framework is thoughtful and lucid. Ultimately, the
book emphasizes the complexity of ensuring that
budget transparency is not just another public sector
management technique, a trendy technocratic tool for
“good governance” (that can then ultimately reify a
neoliberal agenda), but a truly empowering principle,
one that should ultimately enable citizens to make
governments more responsive to their grievances and
needs.
Note
1.

See the White House press release on “Transparency and Open
Government” at http://1.usa.gov/1dLtUiU (accessed March
17, 2014).
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